Juventus Shift Their Recruitment Compass: Carnevali, Italian Players and the Price of a Settlement Agreement

At Continassa, the Juventus training complex on the northern edge of Torino, there is a room that very few supporters have ever stepped into. For years, that room was the heart of a recruitment department regarded as one of the most modern in Serie A: every week hundreds of matches were fed into the system, every young player across Europe was scored by computer according to xG, progressive passes, high-press capacity and countless metrics the eye cannot follow. The final vote was usually just a human confirmation of what the algorithm proposed. But in the weeks of this season, according to Tuttosport, most of that room has fallen silent. It has not been abolished. It is being taken apart to be reassembled in a different shape, and the person holding the screwdriver is Giovanni Carnevali, the newly appointed Chief Executive Officer of Juventus.

There is no goal to tell in this story. There is only an empty room, a settlement agreement with UEFA, and three player names that most Vietnamese viewers have never heard. But it is precisely these things that do not appear on the scoreboard that are shaping Juventus's fate for years to come. A change in the boardroom can decide which player wears the black and white stripes, and which player is pushed to the margins of the plan. They do not touch the ball, but they hold the whole world.

Context: The man from Sassuolo

Giovanni Carnevali is not a familiar name to most Juventus fans in Asia. But in Italy, he is one of the most respected sporting executives of the past decade. Since 2026, he has been attached to Sassuolo, a small club in the Emilia-Romagna region, and turned it into a model of the "buy cheap - develop - sell high" approach in Italian football. Carnevali's Sassuolo did not compete for titles, but it consistently produced and sold young Italian players for many times their original cost. That is a business model more than a sporting one, and it worked perfectly at the scale of a mid-table club.

Now that model is being grafted onto a giant. Juventus's appointment of Carnevali as CEO is a clear signal: the leadership wants someone who understands how to run a club under tight financial conditions, someone who knows how to turn unknown players into sellable assets. The immediate question is whether the Sassuolo method can scale up to Juventus's size. A club that once conquered Europe cannot survive merely by selling players. It needs trophies, needs a packed stadium, needs Champions League nights.

According to information aggregated from La Gazzetta dello Sport and Tuttosport, Juventus's new philosophy revolves around two axes: reducing the use of algorithms in scouting, and increasing attention to Italian players. These are two seemingly unrelated things, but in fact they are tightly connected by a third variable that few mention: the settlement agreement with UEFA.

The settlement agreement: The number that truly shapes everything

To understand why Juventus is changing direction at this precise moment, one must read carefully the numbers UEFA has imposed on the club. Juventus is operating under a "UEFA Settlement Agreement" - a multi-year settlement, not a one-off sanction. Within this agreement, the financial milestones are clearly defined. In the current financial reporting period, Juventus's deficit is capped at a maximum of 5 million euros. In the following year, the club must target break-even. By 2028, Juventus must achieve full compliance within a three-year cycle under the "football revenue rule". More notably, if Juventus records a football revenue deficit and its squad cost-to-revenue ratio exceeds 70 percent in 2026, restrictions may be extended into the 2027-2028 period.

Here we should pause to explain the terminology, because it determines the whole story. The "squad cost-to-revenue ratio" is the total cost of the squad, including player wages, transfer amortisation and agent fees, divided by the club's revenue. If this ratio exceeds 70 percent, it means more than seven-tenths of the club's income is swallowed by the squad itself. That is the warning threshold UEFA monitors closely. And perhaps the most important clause is the rule that "spending must not exceed income". In other words, Juventus is forced to operate at almost zero net spending in the transfer market. To buy, it must sell first.

This is exactly the point that many analyses in the Italian press overlook. They look at Juventus turning to young Italian players and call it a "new philosophy", a "new direction". But set against the settlement agreement, it becomes an accounting decision far more than a sporting choice. Young Italian players carry low transfer fees, low wages, long amortisation periods and high resale potential - four characteristics that fit perfectly with a club whose hands are financially tied.

According to La Gazzetta dello Sport, Juventus is monitoring three specific names, and they span three different positions. The first is Romano, a midfielder born in 2026, meaning barely eighteen to twenty years old. The second is Palmisani, a goalkeeper. The third is Raimondo, a forward currently owned by Bologna. If one looks closely at the origin of these targets, one notices something worth pondering: Juventus is scouting from Cagliari, Frosinone and Bologna, not from the top European market as usual.

Three players, three positions, a very young age. This is not how a club goes to buy stars. This is how a club goes to fill foundations. And when a club like Juventus starts filling foundations instead of buying peaks, it is a sign that it has fallen back in the food chain of European football.

The recruitment overhaul: When poets are put back on the shelf

According to Tuttosport, the recruitment department at Continassa requires "near-total restructuring". Sporting Director Marco Ottolini has worked on it for about nine months but still needs more personnel. And the two candidates being considered to lead the talent identification department are Enrico Paresce and Davide Cangini, both of whom have experience across multiple clubs and countries, from Torino, Roma and Rennes to Sassuolo.

Nine months is a long time in modern football. It means Juventus enters at least one transfer window with an incomplete recruitment department. While rivals already have networks, already have data, already have relationships with academies, Juventus is still assembling from scratch. This is an execution risk, not a tactical risk, and it is often underestimated.

More interestingly, if one looks at the resumes of Paresce and Cangini, both have international backgrounds. That raises an interesting question: if the new recruitment department is led by people with international networks, is the "more Italian players" story really a narrowing of scope, or just a rephrasing of the same strategy? It is quite possible the department will still search globally, but the acceptance criteria will be stricter financially. The poets of data, the analysts who once sat in that silent room, may simply be waiting to be reassigned to a narrower role. Substitute goalkeepers - poets who are never published. The recruitment departments of the algorithmic era, at times, find themselves in a similar position: they write a great deal, but no one prints it.

Back to the story of the pivot. When a club begins to describe its strategy with the words "less algorithm", it implies that it previously relied too much on algorithms. And for many years, Juventus was in fact famous for using data to find bargains the market undervalued. But data does not automatically create a team. It can point to a player with impressive defensive metrics, but it cannot point to whether that player can withstand the pressure of the Allianz Stadium, or whether he can integrate into the dressing room of a club whose expectation is to win every season. There is a gap between the number and the actual rhythm of a match that no algorithm can fill. Perhaps Carnevali understands this, and that is why he wants to put people back at the centre of the decision-making process.

Three names, three positions, one philosophy

Let us look closely at the three names Juventus is monitoring to see how they are thinking.

Romano is a midfielder born in 2026. At this age, a player usually has no high market value, no large wage, and if he develops well, his value can multiply several times within a few years. For a club bound to break-even, this is the most attractive profile: low risk because little money, but high upside if the player explodes. A young midfielder is also an easy position to rotate, easy to bring on from the bench, easy to resell when the books need balancing.

Palmisani is a goalkeeper. Juventus monitoring a goalkeeper is notable because at this position, big clubs rarely rotate. A young goalkeeper is usually brought in only as a long-term backup, or to prepare for selling a current goalkeeper at a good price. In either case, this is an operational move rather than a move for the first team. It shows Juventus is building depth rather than buying established names.

Raimondo is a forward owned by Bologna. His story is the most notable of all. A forward Juventus is eyeing could be a backup for the attack, or a bargaining chip. The fact that he is owned by Bologna makes this deal potentially easier procedurally, since Bologna is a club with stable transfer relations with the big Serie A sides.

Notably, these three positions span midfielder, goalkeeper and forward. These are not three deals to solve a specific problem. These are three deals to patch several holes at once, at minimal cost, and in the hope that at least one of them grows into an asset of value. This approach has a name: it is called cheap depth investment.

The blind spot of collective memory: When a giant learns to become a seller

This is where I want to offer a contrarian view. Most commentary in Italy is either praising this change as a smart innovation by Juventus, or, conversely, criticising it as a financial surrender. Both readings miss the most important point.

What observers rarely mention is that Juventus accepting the "buy young - develop - sell" model is not merely a temporary strategy to get through a difficult period. It is a permanent change of position in the hierarchy of European football. When a club starts buying from Cagliari, Frosinone and Bologna instead of from Ajax, Benfica or the top South American sides, it has dropped a rung in the food chain. And once it has dropped, climbing back to the previous position is extremely difficult, because that position has been taken by rivals with long-term contracts and long-standing relationships.

Juventus is in a situation its own history never prepared it for. This is a club that once bought the world's top players, once sold players for world-record fees, once was a destination rather than a transit point. Now it is described with a word that was previously used only for mid-table clubs: "restructuring". The collective memory of Juventus fans still lives in the glow of consecutive titles and Champions League nights. But that memory cannot pay the bills. And when reality drifts too far from memory, pressure appears.

The accompanying news in the same context makes this tension clearer. One related headline remarks that Juventus is "considered too quick to give up on" Luiz and Gonzalez. This is an opinion, not a verifiable fact, but it shows one thing: people are beginning to question the pace of the squad purge. Meanwhile, another headline says Kolo Muani underwent surgery but "remains available" - an injury-management detail to be cross-checked carefully, since it comes from a secondary source.

The crux is this: Juventus's strategy of buying young Italians and the fans' belief that the club must compete immediately are two forces pulling in opposite directions. If Juventus persists with the new model, it may have to accept trophy-less seasons. But if it yields to pressure and returns to buying stars, it will breach its financial constraints and face the risk of restrictions being extended all the way to 2027-2028. There is no easy choice.

Where the risk lies

Taken together, the risk picture for Juventus in this period comprises four main areas.

Sporting risk: rebuilding with young, cheap players puts short-term results in jeopardy. A young squad needs time to mature, but at Juventus, time is the most luxurious thing of all.

Financial risk: the danger of breaching the 5 million euro deficit or the 70 percent cost ratio threshold in 2026 could lead to extended restrictions. This is a medium-probability but high-impact risk, because it affects every other decision.

Personnel risk: the recruitment department is still incomplete. Delays in hiring could lead to missing targets or making hasty decisions as the window closes.

Media and public opinion risk: news about being "too quick to give up" on players and injury situations could create pressure on the coaching staff if results decline. In Italian football, media pressure can become sacking pressure very quickly.

Notably, these four risks are not separate. They resonate. Financial constraint leads to a weaker squad, a weaker squad leads to poorer results, poorer results lead to media pressure, and media pressure can break the very strategy being built. Such a loop is very hard to break from within.

From the perspective of the Korean market

Based on my experience watching matches over many years, particularly K League games and European leagues via broadcast, I have noticed a recurring pattern. When a big club is forced to turn to a cheap domestic recruitment strategy, that domestic market heats up. The small clubs that sell players to the big side get money, and they use that money to raise the prices of their next players. This creates a domino effect: after just a few transfer windows, the price of young domestic players in a country can rise significantly.

In Italy, this means Cagliari, Frosinone and Bologna could benefit from Juventus's growing demand. If a giant turns to the domestic market, the clubs supplying it gain better negotiating positions. This is a real, though hard-to-measure, effect, and it shows that the recruitment decisions of a top club can ripple down through an entire nation's football system.

But there is a downside. If Juventus takes too many young players from small clubs, those clubs lose their assets, and the overall quality of the league may suffer. In the long run, this is a game both sides can win or both sides can lose, depending on how it is managed.

What to watch

There are several signals that anyone interested in Juventus should track in the coming months.

First is the deficit against the 5 million euro threshold. It will be reflected in the club's financial reports and UEFA disclosures. If Juventus overspends, or breaches the threshold, the consequence will be extended restrictions.

Second is the squad cost ratio in 2026. If it exceeds 70 percent, restrictions may carry over into 2027-2028. This is the variable to watch most closely, because it is decisive for the club's medium-term future.

Third are the appointments within the recruitment department. When Paresce or Cangini is chosen, the recruitment direction will become clearer, and we will know whether the "more Italian players" story is truly a narrowing or just a rephrasing.

Fourth is the completion of deals for Romano, Palmisani and Raimondo. If all three are signed, the new strategy will have concrete evidence. If none arrive, the "new direction" story may quickly be labelled a failure by the Italian press.

One final contrarian angle

There is one thing most analyses overlook: it may be that "reducing algorithms" is not a philosophical choice, but a cost-cutting decision disguised as a cultural shift. A data analytics department is expensive. It requires high-quality personnel, costly software, and time to operate. In a club financially bound, cutting this department could save a significant sum, and presenting it as a strategic pivot toward Italian players is a far more skilful communication move than saying outright that the budget was cut.

I am not claiming this is the truth. I am only saying it is possible, and that an honest analyst should ask "who benefits, who loses" before accepting too smooth a story. In modern football, every strategic change has a hidden financial motive behind it. The observer's job is to find it.

Freezing the memory

Contracts have their summer, but love has its winter. Juventus is entering a winter of its own, a winter in which it must learn to live with less, buy cheaper, and hope more in players whose names no one knows today. The three names Romano, Palmisani, Raimondo may become pillars of the next decade, or they may vanish within a few seasons, like countless young players who were once monitored and then forgotten.

What is worth pondering is not whom Juventus will sign in the next transfer window. It is whether a club once defined by trophies can accept being redefined by balance sheets. In the silent room at Continassa, where algorithms are being taken down from the shelf, perhaps someone is asking that very question. And the answer will not come from a computer.