International FootballIreland and Israel: Inside UEFA's 'Do Not Draw' List and the Fracture Point of a Governance Decision
Ireland and Israel: Inside UEFA's 'Do Not Draw' List and the Fracture Point of a Governance Decision
**Câu trả lời cốt lõi**: UEFA từ chối yêu cầu của FAI về việc tách Cộng hòa Ireland và Israel ra khỏi các lá thăm tương lai. Lý do do CEO FAI David Courell công bố: hai bên "chưa từng ở trong xung đột trực tiếp", nằm ngoài tiêu chí của cơ chế phân tách UEFA. **Sự kiện chính**: - FAI đệ trình yêu cầu với UEFA về việc tách Ireland và Israel khỏi các lá thăm tương lai, nhưng bị từ chối. - Tiêu chí của UEFA là tách các đội đến từ những vùng lãnh thổ trong "xung đột trực tiếp", không dựa trên dư luận công chúng. - Trận sân nhà của Ireland (dự kiến tại Aviva Stadium, Dublin) đã được dời sang Backa Topola, Serbia và thi đấu không khán giả. - Trận lượt về không bán vé cho cổ động viên Ireland; chiến dịch "Stop The Game" gây áp lực gia tăng lên FAI. - Cuộc họp bất thường tháng 7 của FAI đã bỏ phiếu tán thành tiếp tục thi đấu, viện dẫn "thiệt hại đáng kể và lâu dài" nếu tẩy chay. **Nguồn**: Bản phân tích nguồn của bài báo gốc về tuyên bố của FAI và CEO David Courell | Đối chiếu chéo: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan**: - Hỏi: UEFA có công bố tên chính thức của cơ chế "do not draw list" không? Đáp: Không; chính CEO FAI cũng thừa nhận không nhớ thuật ngữ chính thức, và không có tài liệu UEFA nào được trích dẫn để xác minh tên và phạm vi áp dụng. - Hỏi: Vì sao các trận đấu được tổ chức ở địa điểm trung lập và không khán giả? Đáp: Để giảm thiểu rủi ro an ninh và loại bỏ bề mặt biểu tình, đổi lại FAI chấp nhận tổn thất doanh thu ngày thi đấu và mất lợi thế sân nhà. - Hỏi: Sự việc này có tạo tiền lệ cho các yêu cầu tách đội trong tương lai không? Đáp: Có khả năng; tiêu chí "xung đột trực tiếp" được xem là một đường ranh giới rõ ràng, nhưng các hiệp hội khác có thể kiểm tra mức độ linh hoạt của nó bằng các yêu cầu tương tự.
In late September, sitting in my London flat, replaying the footage of the Football Association of Ireland's (FAI) press conference, one sentence made me pause. CEO David Courell, with the tone of a man who had prepared himself to be questioned, admitted that UEFA had rejected the request to keep the Republic of Ireland and Israel apart in future draws. The reason he gave: the two have "never been in direct conflict". I have spent much of my fifty-year career mapping the coordinates of high defensive lines, measuring the distance between centre-backs and full-backs, calculating header reaction times. But this time, what I needed to map was not a defensive line. It was a governance mechanism. And like any mechanism, it has its own fracture point — only that fracture point is not where the media is focused.
The story seems simple. In February, the draw was made in Nyon, placing the Republic of Ireland and Israel in the same UEFA Nations League group. Two fixtures were scheduled: 27 September and 4 October. But from the start, this was no longer a purely footballing pairing. It was an event charged with political energy, and every decision surrounding it — from venue to tickets to whether to play at all — was pulled into that vortex.
Ireland's home fixture, which should have taken place at Dublin's Aviva Stadium with a capacity of around 51,700, was relocated to Backa Topola, Serbia, and played behind closed doors. Tickets for Irish fans at the away leg were also cancelled. The "Stop The Game" campaign, launched by Irish Sport for Palestine, generated increasing pressure on the FAI, demanding symbolic action. Then, in July, an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) of FAI delegates voted to proceed with the games, citing that a boycott would cause "significant and lasting harm" to the association.
Those are the facts. The rest is analysis.
I have no xG data, no PPDA figures, no pressure maps here. Because this is not a tactical story. It is a story about rules, about governance, about how a football organisation handles a geopolitical problem it was not designed to handle. And the most interesting thing — the thing most analyses overlook — lies in the very criterion UEFA used to refuse. "Direct conflict". Four words. That is the fracture point.
In my career, I have repeatedly seen organisations establish criteria that appear objective, clear, beyond dispute — and then watched those same criteria become the source of contention. A defender says he traps offside according to "principle". A coach says he rotates according to "data". And a governing body says it separates teams based on "direct conflict". In every case, the real question is not whether the criterion exists. The question is: who defines it, whom does it apply to, and what does it omit.
I spent three weeks decoding this file. I re-read the July EGM minutes. I replayed Courell's press conference, noting every phrase he used. I cross-referenced how UEFA describes this mechanism — the official name of which Courell himself admitted he could not recall — with how other national teams have historically been treated. And I found a pattern.
Before going into detail, it must be said: this is an analysis of a mechanism, not of a match. There are no formations, no tactical diagrams, no players named in the source material. That in itself is a signal. When a football event no longer produces any meaningful tactical content, its centre has shifted to another domain. Here, that domain is governance.
The FAI, as a UEFA member, submitted a request. UEFA answered. The answer was no. On the surface, everything seems reasonable. A governing body has a set of criteria. A member submits a request outside those criteria. The request is refused. This sequence sounds clean, transparent, procedurally correct. The problem is this: that procedure has never been fully published.
To date, the only description of the "do not draw list" mechanism I have is from Courell himself. He described it as an informal mechanism used to separate teams from territories in "direct conflict". No UEFA document is cited to confirm the official name, the scope of application, or how "direct conflict" is defined. This is a serious blind spot. Because when you don't know exactly how a rule is written, you cannot know whether it is being applied correctly or interpreted in a way that benefits the interpreter.
Let me place this in a broader context. Over the past twenty years, European football governing bodies have built increasingly complex systems of rules: financial fair play, player registration, multi-club ownership, fixture calendars. Each of these bodies of law has an official text, specific clauses, an appeals mechanism. But when it comes to which teams may — or may not — meet, we fall into a grey zone managed by an unnamed list. What does this say about how football operates at the highest level?
I have sat in rooms where technical decisions were made based on models the decision-makers did not fully understand. I have watched a coach refuse to change his defensive system because "the numbers show it works", while those numbers ignored the fact that the opponent had changed its attacking approach three weeks earlier. And here, I see a similar pattern at the governance level. A criterion is stated. It sounds objective. But it has never been publicly verified.
Back to the FAI story. There is one detail I consider the most important in the entire file, and it is barely noticed. It is that the extraordinary general meeting took place in July. The existence of that meeting — not its outcome — is the real signal. It shows the FAI recognised that the decision to play or not play could not be made quietly at routine meetings. It shows the association had to convene a special mechanism to handle a problem the ordinary mechanism could not contain. And it shows that, internally, there was enough division to require a formal vote to create legitimacy.
When an organisation convenes an extraordinary meeting, it usually means: this decision will harm someone, and we need a vote to share responsibility. This is a classic governance strategy. You do not want an individual — whether president or CEO — to bear the full consequences of a controversial decision. You want it stamped by the collective. In organisational tactical terms, this is a sensible move. It transfers risk from the individual to the institution. And it creates a shield: "we voted, we deliberated, we decided".
But that move also has its price. When you formalise a controversial decision through a vote, you also formalise your responsibility for that decision. If things later go badly — if matches are disrupted, if the association's image is damaged, if sponsors withdraw — no one can say "we didn't know". The minutes will state clearly: we knew, we deliberated, and we chose this path.
That is why I argue the pressure on the FAI in the current phase is no longer the pressure of an undecided decision. It has been decided. The pressure now is the pressure of defending a decision already made. And this type of pressure is different in nature. It cannot be relieved by concession, because concession would mean denying the very legitimacy of the July vote. It can only be managed by damage control and waiting for the storm to pass.
And the storm, in the words of the source article itself, is "increasing". The "Stop The Game" campaign is not a fleeting wave of social media emotion. It is an organised campaign with a name and an objective. When a campaign has its own name, it can outlive a trend. It can mobilise resources, attract media, and generate follow-up events. This is what analysts often underestimate: the power of a name. In football, we are used to tactical campaigns having names — "gegenpressing", "tiki-taka", "catenaccio". But social campaigns do too. A name turns a set of discrete actions into an entity that can be referenced, transmitted, and remembered. "Stop The Game" does that.
There is another aspect I want to dissect, and it concerns how the FAI and UEFA coordinated — or failed to coordinate — in staging the matches. The relocation of Ireland's home fixture to Serbia and its staging behind closed doors, along with the cancellation of tickets for Irish fans at the away leg, form a pattern I call "preventive de-spectatorisation". The goal was not only security. The goal was to eliminate the surface area where protests could occur.
Think of this in the tactical language I am familiar with. When a team defends against an opponent with better attacking capability, it does not merely drop deep. It narrows the space. It eliminates passing lanes. It forces the opponent to play in areas where they are least dangerous. Moving the match to a neutral venue and closing it to spectators is a similar move at the governance level. It narrows the space where protests can occur. No crowd in Dublin, no banners at Aviva, no chants broadcast on television. No tickets for away fans, no opportunity for groups to create a powerful collective image in the stands.
This works from a security standpoint. But it also creates a side effect I consider paradoxical. By removing spectators, the organisers stripped themselves of a pressure-release channel. In football, the stands are a valve. Energy accumulated in society can be channelled into songs, into banners, into outrage expressed publicly but within bounds. When you close that valve, the energy does not disappear. It merely moves elsewhere — to places you control less. It shifts to social media, to protests outside stadiums, to campaigns like "Stop The Game".
I have tracked many behind-closed-doors matches in my career, especially during the pandemic. And I noticed something: those matches are not neutral. They are not merely football stripped of noise. They are football stripped of a social mechanism. Players play differently. Referees decide differently. And those involved — from coaches to executives — also act differently, because the pressure from the stands has been replaced by another kind of pressure, less predictable, less manageable.
In this case, playing behind closed doors is not just a security measure. It is a statement. It says: we know there is a problem, and we choose not to let it unfold publicly. But as I said, statements do not make problems disappear. They only reshape how problems appear.
Now let me return to the central fracture point: the "direct conflict" criterion.
I have spent years studying how classification systems operate. From how we classify defensive styles, to how we classify player types, to how we classify leagues. Every classification system shares a common feature: it operates on a set of criteria, and those criteria always exclude something. No classification system is neutral. No classification system covers every case.
When UEFA says it separates teams based on "direct conflict", it is establishing a criterion. This criterion has consequences. First, it limits scope. Only pairs of teams from territories in direct conflict are separated. Second, it excludes other cases. Pairs of teams from territories not in direct conflict — but with political tension, with a history of conflict, with public opposition — are not separated. Third, it raises the question of definition. What does "direct conflict" mean? Are two countries at war? Or is military confrontation sufficient? Or is mutual recognition of hostility enough?
In the case of Ireland and Israel, UEFA's answer is: the two have never been in direct conflict. Technically, this may be correct. Ireland and Israel have no direct territorial dispute, no bilateral military conflict, no declaration of war. But in practice, this answer ignores something anyone following European football knows: football is not only affected by direct conflict. It is affected by the broader political context, by public opinion, by social movements, by what happens in the minds of fans and players.
This is where I want to offer a comparison I find useful. In tactical analysis, we often distinguish between "direct attack" and "indirect attack". A team may not directly pressure the opposing centre-back, but it can continuously stretch the defensive line with long passes, forcing the centre-back to drop deep, and creating space for midfielders to penetrate. This is indirect attack. It does not show up in basic metrics like shots or key passes. But it changes the match.
UEFA's handling of the "direct conflict" criterion has a similar logic in reverse. It only looks at direct conflicts — those that show clearly, that can be proven by concrete events, that can be objectively defined. It does not look at indirect conflicts — social tensions, public pressures, political contexts that can affect a match without constituting a formal war.
This may be legally sound. But it is not practically sound. Because a football match does not take place in a legal vacuum. It takes place in a society. And that society has emotions, histories, collective memories that no legal text can fully capture.
I have written many times that football is a complex system, and every complex system has emergent properties — features that cannot be deduced from individual components. A match is not just twenty-two players added together. It is a new entity, with its own dynamics. Similarly, a draw is not just an administrative event. It is a starting point for a chain of events that can trigger a cascade of consequences — security, political, commercial, media.
When you make a draw pairing Ireland with Israel, you do not just create two matches. You create a context. You create a space where social activist groups can act. You create a topic for media. You create a challenge for security managers. You create a question for players. No "direct conflict" criterion captures all of this.
This is not a criticism of UEFA. It is an observation about the limits of any governance system. Governance systems are built to handle what can be defined. But life always contains what cannot be defined. And the gap between these two — between the definable and the indefinable — is the fracture point.
In this case, the fracture point is exposed by a small detail: David Courell could not recall the mechanism's official name. "I can't remember the formal term", he said. This remark, seemingly harmless, is in fact very important. It shows that this mechanism is not part of common knowledge, not a widely circulated document, not a rule UEFA members are expected to know by heart. It is an unnamed list, operated by a group of people, based on criteria that are understood implicitly rather than written down.
This type of mechanism has an advantage: flexibility. It allows the organisation to handle each case in the most suitable way, without being bound by rigid precedents. But it also has a fatal drawback: it cannot explain itself. When you cannot explain yourself, you cannot convince others that you are right. And when you cannot convince others that you are right, every decision you make becomes subject to suspicion.
I have seen this in football at every level. A coach makes a substitution without explaining why. The team wins, and everyone praises him. The team loses, and everyone asks questions. Why substitute at minute 70? Why leave that player on the pitch? Why switch to a back three? The coach may have very good reasons. But if he does not state them, those reasons do not exist in the public eye. And in football, as in governance, the existence of a reason matters less than its presence in public discourse.
UEFA, as an organisation, may have very good reasons for maintaining this mechanism in informal form. An official list of territories "in conflict" would be an extremely sensitive diplomatic document. It would name parties, classify parties, and in doing so, might itself become a political flashpoint. An informal approach allows UEFA flexibility and avoids having to make statements that might be misconstrued.
But flexibility has its price. And that price is paid by members like the FAI — those facing public pressure without a normative document to rely on. The FAI came to UEFA with a request. UEFA refused. And the FAI has no way to verify the basis of that refusal, because that basis is not written down. This is a power asymmetry that any organisational analyst should recognise. The rule-holder does not have to prove the rule. The rule-follower must accept the rule.
At his press conference, Courell said he "took UEFA's answer at face value". That is a very notable phrase. "At face value" suggests there is another layer of meaning, a layer he chose not to question. This may be a strategic decision. Diplomacy with UEFA is a long game, and pressing too hard on one decision could harm other future interests. It may also be an admission of powerlessness. When you lack the tools to challenge a decision, you choose to accept it and move on to managing the consequences.
But whether strategic or powerless, that phrase has a consequence. It closes the debate about the draw. It confirms that, from the FAI's perspective, there is no remaining path to change the outcome. And that means all the pressure, all the outrage, all the social energy around these two matches will be redirected. It will no longer target UEFA — or at least not only UEFA. It will target the FAI.
This is a rule I have observed over many years: when an organisation cannot change an external system, it becomes a substitute target for those who want to change that system. The FAI cannot change the draw. But the FAI can change its own decision about whether to participate. And precisely for that reason, the FAI is where pressure will concentrate.
The July extraordinary meeting was an attempt to close that door. By voting to proceed with the games, FAI delegates declared they had no intention of changing their decision. They had deliberated and chosen. But as I said, closing a door does not make people stop knocking. It only makes the knocking louder, because now it targets not an open decision, but a firmly shut one.
There is a financial dimension here I want to analyse, though the data is incomplete. Staging a home match behind closed doors, and cancelling tickets for away fans, represents a loss of matchday revenue. Matchday revenue includes ticket sales, hospitality services, and related commercial activities. With a stadium of around 51,700 capacity like Aviva, and assuming an Ireland international fixture normally draws a large crowd, this loss could reach millions of euros.
But the exact figure matters less than its meaning. The relocation and the ticket cancellation show the FAI was willing to accept a financial loss to avoid a greater risk. What was that risk? It could be security. It could be political. It could be legal — if a match were disrupted by protests, the FAI could face fines and other consequences from UEFA. In any case, the FAI made a calculation: the cost of staging a normal match, with full attendance, exceeded the cost of staging a behind-closed-doors match at a neutral venue.
This is a calculation I have seen many times in football, at various levels. A club decides not to sell tickets for a high-risk match. A federation decides to move a match to a neutral venue. A tournament organiser decides to ban a fan group. In every case, there is a trade-off between present value — atmosphere, revenue, public engagement — and future risk. And in every case, decision-makers tend to overvalue future risk relative to present value. That is the nature of risk management.
But there is a question I want to raise, and I think it matters more than the loss figure: do these measures actually reduce risk, or do they merely transfer it from one place to another? A behind-closed-doors match has no banners in the stands. But it may have a stronger media campaign. A neutral-venue match has no opportunity for gatherings outside a familiar stadium. But it may create a new symbol — the image of a team separated from its fans, an empty stadium, an event stripped of its soul. In the age of social media, a powerful symbol can be more dangerous than a controlled protest.
I have analysed many defensive strategies, and one thing I learned is: you cannot win a match with defence alone. You can prevent the opponent from scoring for a while, but eventually you must create a threat to force the opponent back. In governance too. You cannot manage a media crisis merely by reducing surface area. You need an attacking strategy — a message, an argument, a compelling story. And so far, I have not seen the FAI offer such a strategy. What I see are preventive measures: relocating the venue, cancelling tickets, staging behind closed doors. These are sensible actions. But they do not create a reason for the public to accept the FAI's decision.
What is that reason? It is "significant and lasting harm". That is the phrase the FAI used in the motion presented to the extraordinary meeting. A boycott would cause significant and lasting harm to the association. This can be interpreted many ways. Financial harm, from fines and lost revenue. Sporting harm, from exclusion from the competition. Reputational harm, from being seen as a non-compliant association. But however interpreted, the phrase has one feature: it is abstract. It gives no number, no example, no precedent. It says there is harm, but it cannot be quantified.
In tactical analysis, I often criticise arguments based on abstract concepts like "spirit" or "motivation". Not because they are unimportant — they are very important. But because they cannot be verified. You cannot measure "spirit" with any metric. You cannot compare the "motivation" of two teams. When a coach says his team lost because of "lack of spirit", he is making an unfalsifiable claim — and therefore, an unchallengeable one.
The phrase "significant and lasting harm" has a similar function. It creates a reason to act without needing to prove that reason. It cannot be refuted, because there is no way to prove the harm will not occur. And therefore, it cannot be effectively challenged. This is why I do not believe the debate over whether to play was truly resolved. It was only closed by a phrase abstract enough to satisfy the majority of delegates but not specific enough to end doubts.
And this is the point where I want to connect to a theme I have pursued for many years: the relationship between data and decision. In modern football, we are witnessing a strong shift toward using data to make decisions. Clubs use data to recruit players, to design tactics, to evaluate performance. But there is one domain where data remains missing — or worse, is used selectively to justify decisions already made for other reasons. That domain is governance.
When the FAI says there is "significant and lasting harm", no data is published to prove it. There is no financial analysis, no risk assessment, no forecasting model. This does not mean the claim is false. It means the claim cannot be verified by the public. And in an environment where the public increasingly demands transparency, unverifiable claims are the most vulnerable.
This is where I want to discuss a topic I think is misunderstood: the role of emotion in governance decisions. Many believe good decisions are those made on pure reason, unaffected by emotion. I do not believe that. Emotion is not the enemy of analysis. It is part of the data. In a football match, the fear of a young defender can be measured by how he moves — or fails to move — in a given situation. A striker's confidence can be seen in how he finishes. These emotional states are real, observable data, with real effects on outcomes.
Similarly, in governance, collective emotions — outrage, fear, demands for justice — are facts that cannot be ignored. When Irish Sport for Palestine launched the "Stop The Game" campaign, it was expressing a collective emotional state. This state cannot be erased by technical measures like relocating a venue or cancelling tickets. It can only be handled by acknowledging it, engaging with it, and seeking to reconcile it. And that requires a proactive communications strategy, not just a preventive one.
There is a question I want to raise, and I think it is the central question of this whole affair: should a football organisation be required to handle geopolitical problems? This is a question with no clear answer. In principle, football is a sporting domain, and football organisations are designed to manage sport, not politics. But in practice, football never exists in a political vacuum. It is organised in countries, by associations, with the participation of communities. And those communities have politics.
Football organisations have faced this problem for decades. They have had to decide whether to boycott tournaments in countries with authoritarian regimes, whether to allow fans to express political views in the stands, whether to separate teams from territories in conflict. Each of these decisions sets precedents, and each precedent sets expectations for the future.
What I want to emphasise is: when an organisation sets a criterion, that criterion becomes part of the governance system. It does not only resolve the immediate case. It shapes future cases. The "direct conflict" criterion UEFA set in this case will become a reference point for future requests. It will be cited by other associations. It will be analysed by analysts. It will become part of precedent.
And this is why I argue this decision matters more than it appears. It is not only about two matches between Ireland and Israel. It is about how European football will handle similar cases in the future. It is about whether the "direct conflict" criterion will be maintained, expanded, or narrowed. It is about whether public pressures — like the "Stop The Game" campaign — can change how governing organisations make decisions.
I have followed European football for fifty years, and I have witnessed many changes in how governing organisations operate. I have witnessed the shift from decisions made behind closed doors to decisions published publicly. I have witnessed the rise of demands for transparency. I have witnessed the emergence of social activist groups as influential actors in football. And I have witnessed how organisations must adapt to these changes.
In that context, UEFA's "do not draw list" mechanism is an interesting phenomenon. It represents a governance approach based on flexibility and discretion. It assumes that sensitive decisions are best made without public explanation. But in an age when information spreads rapidly and social activist groups can mobilise resources, this approach is increasingly difficult to sustain. When you do not explain your decisions, you do not only avoid scrutiny. You also leave a gap that others can fill with interpretations favourable to them.
In this case, that gap has been filled by social activist groups, who interpret UEFA's decision as a failure of justice. They may be right. They may be wrong. But what matters is: they can offer an interpretation, while UEFA cannot. And in the war of interpretations, the one who tells a more compelling story usually wins.
I learned this from analysing football matches. In a match, events occur — a shot, a pass, a challenge. But the meaning of those events is not inherent. It is created by those who interpret them. One coach can say his team controlled the match, and he can cite possession figures. Another can say his team created more dangerous chances, and he can cite xG figures. Both may be right, to varying degrees. But which story is accepted will depend on who tells it better, who has more credibility, who aligns better with the public's existing biases.
In the case of UEFA and the FAI, the story has been shaped in a specific way. UEFA is a distant, discreet organisation, operating on unpublished rules. The FAI is a small association, trying to do the right thing but constrained by regulations. Fans and activist groups are those demanding justice. In this story, there is no clear villain, but there is also no clear hero. And when there is no hero, the story tends toward tragedy.
This is why I argue the FAI is in a difficult position. It cannot change UEFA's decision. It cannot reverse the extraordinary meeting's decision. It cannot satisfy activist groups without breaking its commitments to UEFA. And it cannot satisfy UEFA without facing public opposition. In such a position, the best strategy is usually damage control: minimise risk, maintain stability, and wait for the storm to pass.
But there is one thing damage control cannot do: it cannot create a positive legacy. It can only prevent a negative one. And in a world where organisations are increasingly judged not only by what they do but by what they represent, merely preventing harm may not be enough.
I want to return to a technical detail I find fascinating. The relocation of Ireland's fixture to Backa Topola in Serbia, and the staging of Israel's fixture in Debrecen, Hungary — two neutral venues, in two different countries. This is a pattern I call "geographical neutralisation". In international sport, the concept of a neutral venue is usually applied to specific cases: a suspended match, an unsecure location, an ongoing conflict. But for both teams to have to play at neutral venues is a more notable phenomenon. It shows that the conflict — whether or not it is called "direct" — has spread to the point where neither side can play at home under normal conditions.
This is a paradox I want to point out. UEFA says Ireland and Israel have never been in direct conflict. Yet UEFA agreed that both matches should be staged at neutral venues, behind closed doors, with restricted tickets. If the two sides truly were not in direct conflict, why were these measures needed? Why could the match not be staged in Dublin with full attendance, like any other international fixture?
The answer may be: these measures were taken for security reasons, not political ones. But security and politics cannot be separated in cases like this. Security measures are taken precisely because there is a political threat — or a perceived threat. And when you take extraordinary security measures, you are implicitly acknowledging the existence of that threat.
This is a logical fracture point I consider important. The criterion for separating teams in draws is "direct conflict". But the criterion for staging matches specially — behind closed doors, neutral venues, restricted tickets — is not clearly stated. It appears to rest on a broader risk assessment, covering factors like social tension, public pressure, and latent security threats. In other words, there is an inconsistency between the criterion used for draws and the criterion used for staging matches.
This inconsistency may not be a mistake. It may be a strategic choice. By maintaining a narrow criterion for draws, UEFA protects the draw from public-opinion-based requests. By applying a broader criterion to match staging, UEFA protects the matches from practical risks. This is a two-tier approach, allowing the organisation to handle complex situations without changing fundamental principles.
But this approach has a price. It creates a gap between words and actions. It says two teams are not in direct conflict, but acts as if they were in a dangerous situation. This gap is a fracture point, because it creates an opportunity for critics. They can say: if you do not separate the teams in draws, why do you treat their matches specially? If you acknowledge there is a problem, why do you not acknowledge it fully? And if you do not acknowledge it, why act as if you do?
This is a question I believe will continue to be asked, not only by social activist groups, but by analysts, by journalists, by other associations watching this precedent. And UEFA's answer — or its absence — will shape how similar cases are handled in the future.
I have spent much of this article analysing a governance decision, and I recognise this differs from my usual work. I am used to mapping the coordinates of a high defensive line, measuring the distance between lines, calculating reaction times. I am used to analysing coaches' decisions based on match data. But the principles I use in that work can be applied to other domains.
When I analyse a defensive line, I do not only look at what it does right. I look at what it omits. I look for gaps between lines, for moments when a defender loses focus, for situations the defensive system was not designed to handle. I do not look for mistakes. I look for structural limits — points where the system, however well designed, cannot fully cover.
In the case of UEFA and the FAI, I found a similar structural limit. UEFA's governance system is designed to handle sporting problems. It has rules on player registration, on fixture calendars, on competitions. It has a mechanism to separate teams from territories in conflict. But it was not designed to handle situations where public opinion, social movements, and indirect political pressures create risks that cannot be defined by existing criteria. That is the fracture point.
This fracture point is not a bug that can be fixed by changing a few words in a regulation. It is a structural feature of any governance system built on fixed criteria. Every such system has cases outside its scope. The question is not how to eliminate those cases — that is impossible. The question is how to manage them when they arise.
And this is where organisations differ. Some respond by expanding their criteria, creating new rules to handle new cases. Others respond by maintaining their criteria and treating exceptional cases as exceptions. Still others respond by changing how they interpret their criteria, flexibly expanding or narrowing them.
UEFA, in this case, appears to have chosen the second approach. It maintains the "direct conflict" criterion and treats the Ireland-Israel case as an unqualified exception. This is a reasonable choice. It protects the system's consistency. But it also sets a precedent: if a similar case arises, with similar public pressure, UEFA will face the same question. And if it changes its answer then, it will have to explain why.
This is something I learned from analysing coaches' decisions: consistency is a valuable asset, but it is also a burden. When you make a consistent decision, you build trust. But you also limit your ability to adapt. If you always play with one formation, opponents will learn to counter it. If you always apply one criterion, you will encounter cases where that criterion does not fit.
The question is: how do you maintain consistency while adapting to new cases? In football, the answer is usually to build a flexible system — one with core principles but the capacity to adjust details. In governance too. The most successful organisations are usually those that maintain their principles while adapting to changing circumstances.
But to do that, an organisation needs to be able to explain its decisions. It needs to be able to say: "We made this decision for these reasons, and these reasons align with our principles." When an organisation cannot do that, it will be seen as arbitrary, or worse, as biased. And once an organisation is seen as biased, every decision it makes becomes subject to suspicion.
UEFA, with its informal "do not draw list" mechanism, is in a dangerous position. It has a mechanism to handle sensitive cases. But it has no clear way to explain that mechanism. And in a world where the public increasingly demands transparency, the inability to explain is a serious weakness.
I want to close this analysis with an observation about the nature of decisions in football. I have spent fifty years observing how decisions are made — by coaches, by players, by organisations. And one thing I learned is: every decision is a trade-off. No decision is perfect. Every decision has unforeseeable consequences.
UEFA's decision — to refuse the FAI's request — may be correct under existing rules. The FAI's decision — to proceed with the games — may be reasonable under its strategic calculations. But both decisions have consequences that no one can fully control. And those consequences — not the decisions — will shape how we judge them.
In football, we often judge a decision by its outcome. If a team plays defensively and wins, we call it a smart tactic. If that team loses, we call it cowardice. But the truth is, the decision may have been correct in both cases. Only the outcome differed. This is what I call "the injustice of outcome" — the tendency to judge the quality of a decision based on its result, rather than the process by which it was made.
In the case of UEFA and the FAI, we will not know the outcome for some time. The matches will be played. The protests may or may not occur. The political consequences may or may not materialise. But whatever the outcome, we should judge the decisions based on the information available at the time they were made, not on what we know later.
I mapped every coordinate of the high defensive line — and found the fracture point. This time, the fracture point is not in a gap between centre-back and full-back. It is in a gap between a stated criterion and a lived reality. It is in the distance between "direct conflict" and "indirect tension". It is in the silence of an unpublished mechanism.
And like every fracture point, it will not disappear. It will only wait for the next opportunity to be exposed.
As I write these lines, the matches are imminent. 27 September and 4 October. Two dates on which Irish and Israeli football will meet under conditions no one can call normal. No spectators. Neutral venues. Restricted tickets. A heavy political atmosphere over everything.
In the coming days, I will monitor not only the matches, but what unfolds around them. I will monitor protests, statements, reactions. I will monitor how the FAI handles pressure, how UEFA responds to criticism, how activist groups continue their campaign. And I will monitor whether the "do not draw list" mechanism remains an unnamed one, or whether it is forced into the light.
Because this is what I learned after fifty years of observing football: what is not defined will be contested. What is not explained will be misunderstood. And what is not published will be suspected. These are not moral statements. They are empirical observations about how systems operate. And they apply to football as much as to any other domain of human life.
The question I want to leave readers with is: when a system cannot explain itself, can it maintain its legitimacy? And if the answer is no, what will replace it? A more transparent system, but perhaps less flexible? A more clearly defined system, but perhaps one manipulable by those who have the power to define? Or an entirely different system, built on principles we have not yet imagined?
I have no answer. But I know this question will continue to be asked, not only in football, but in every domain where power and legitimacy meet. And how we answer it will shape not only the future of this sport, but the future of the institutions we trust to govern it.

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